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to their own criminal procedure. The problem is that the Supreme Court
has not left much room for deviation from the principles laid down. One
question which might arise is whether or not the decision should be
applied retrospectively. It is doubtful that the question will be answered
in the affirmative because this decision is of the type which affects only
a police procedure which was considered acceptable before the deci-
sion.' The only other question which seems to be left open is whether or
not the decision should be limited to its facts-to the situation in which
an accused has been indicted and has retained counsel before he is
placed in a lineup. The foregoing discussion and a recognition that the
Supreme Court is telling state courts and law enforcement agencies to
be aware of and to avoid techniques of identification which may be
suggestive should provide an answer to that question.3 5
THOMAS M. STRASSBurG
Federal Income Taxation: the Commissioner's "Sleep or Rest"
Interpretation Sustained: In United States v. Correll,' the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer on a business trip may "deduct the cost of
his meals only if his trip requires him to stop for sleep or rest."2 This
decision has effected a renaissance of the Treasury's interpretation,
which had previously endured judicial hostility from the Sixth3 and
Eighth Circuits,4 and the Tax Court,5 while receiving favorable treat-
ment from the First Circuit.6
3 This is the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in cases concerning a
rule of federal constitutional law the only effect of which is to strike down
a police procedure acceptable at the time of trial. State ex. rel. LaFollette v.
Raskin, 30 Wis.2d 39, 139 N.W.2d 667 (1966). See also, Riemers v. State,
31 Wis.2d 457, 466, 143 N.W.2d 525, 530 (1966) (Miranda and Escobedo not
to be applied retrospectively in Wisconsin).
35 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has clearly limited Escobedo to its facts and
seems to take a narrower attitude toward the right to counsel than does the
United States Supreme Court. Holloway v. State, 32 Wis.2d 559, 563-565, 146
N.W.2d 441, 443-444 (1966); State v. Burnett, 30 Wis.2d 375, 383-384, 141
N.W.2d 221, 225 (1966) ; Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 511f-g, 131 N.V.2d
169, 171-72 (1964). Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how the Wis-
consin court could narrowly interpret Wade.
' United States v. Correll, 88 S.Ct. 445 (1967).
2 Id. at 445.
3 Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966), where the Court held
"the Commissioner's overnight or sleep or rest rule, bears no rational relation
to the business necessity of the meal expenses". Id. at 89.
4 Hanson v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1962), where the Court er-
roneously relied on Williams v. Patterson, Note 16 infra, to allow a deduc-
tion where the taxpayer did not obtain sleep or rest.
5William v. Bagley, 46 T.C. 176 (1966), where the Tax Court abandoned the
previously strict adherence to the overnight rule as the sole criteria of deter-
mining the business travel deduction.
6 Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967), where the court held
"that fairness to the greatest number of people, and at the same time a
practical administrative approach which will not permit every meal-purchasing
taxpayer to take pot lunch in the courts, is to accept the Commissioner's
Sleep or Rest Rule." Id. at 207.
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Homer Correll, a grocery salesman making daily trips for his em-
ployer throughout eastern Tennessee, attempted to deduct the cost of
his meals on these one-day trips as reimbursed travel expenses. The
issue presented to the Court was whether or not the taxpayer had in-
curred the type of expense that falls within the scope of Section
162(a) (2)7 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows a deduction for
travel expenses including the cost of meals and lodging incurred "while
away from home in pursuit of a trade or business."8 The Treasury has
consistently construed this provision to apply only to trips where it was
necessary for the taxpayer to obtain "sleep or rest". This interpretation
dates back to a 1940 ruling 9 which construed the words "while away
from home" in Section 23(a) (1) (A) 10 of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code to include railroad employees "who are required to remain at an
away-from-home terminal in order to obtain necessary rest prior to
making a further run or beginning a return run.""' The rest period con-
templated by the Treasury does not encompass the turn around situation
where the taxpayer on a one-day trip is released simply to obtain a meal
before the return trip.12 In handling these turn-around cases, the
Treasury attempted to distinguish them from those cases where the
taxpayer was released to obtain sleep or rest by designating the latter
as "overnight" cases.' 3 Unfortunately, the term "overnight" was some-
what misleading because the Treasury clearly stated in a 1954 ruling
that it did not require the taxpayer to be away from home for an "entire
twenty-four hour period or from dusk till dawn."' 4 Thus, a taxpayer
who left home at 2:30 a.m. and who was later released for necessary
rest before his return home at 6:00 p.m. could deduct his meal ex-
penses.' 5 Since the Commissioner used the terms "overnight" and "sleep
or rest" interchangeably, it cannot be asserted that he abandoned his
1940 ruling. One major question left unanswered by the 1954 ruling was
whether or not "necessary sleep" contemplated only those situations
where the taxpayer was ordered by his employer to obtain rest. The
Treasury responded to this question by acquiescing 6 to the decision in
Williams v. Patterson" where the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated the cor-
rect rule:
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(a) (2).
8 Ibid.
9 I.T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 64.
'0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §23(a) (1) (A), (Now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(a) (2).
n INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(a) (2).
12See Al J. Smith, 33 T.C. 861 (1960) ; Sam J. Herrin, 28 T.C. 1303 (1957)
Fred M. Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
3 Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 75, 79.
14 Ibid.
15 See Anderson v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 649 (1952).
16 Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 34.
"7Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
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If the nature of the taxpayer's employment is such that when
away from home, during released time, it is reasonable for him
to need and obtain sleep or rest in order to meet the exigencies
of his employment or the business demands of his employment,
his expenditures (including incidental expenses, such as tips)
for the purpose of obtaining sleep or rest are deductible travel
expenses under Section 162 (a) (2) of the 1954 Code.i s
It was pursuant to this interpretation that the Commissioner and
the Court disallowed the deduction to Correll.
Focusing on the rationale behind the approval by the Supreme Court
of the "Sleep or Rest" rule, can it be said that the Supreme Court drew
an arbitrary line at a point where expediency may best be achieved?
The Court admitted that one of the most influential factors of the Com-
missioner's rule was the ease and certainty of its application. 19 The
Court felt, however, that an arbitrary result would follow no matter
where the line was drawn20 but pointed out that the Commissioner's
rule is sound as a matter of statutory construction because it is at least
arguable that the legislative use of the words "meal and lodging" con-
junctively denotes an intent to allow a deduction for one only when the
other is present.21 Further, the statutory history of Section 162(a) (2)
shows that the manifest statutory purpose is to allow a deduction for the
added cost of meals and lodging when business activities result in a
duplication of their cost.22 With the duplication of expense as the under-
lying basis for the travel expense deduction, any test based upon distance
is clearly invalid since the mileage traveled will not result in any dupli-
cation of expense unless the traveler stops for lodging and then dupli-
cates the "continuing acts incurred at a permanent place of abode."23
But even under the "Sleep or Rest" criterion, the taxpayer will receive
at least a partial windfall by way of a deduction for some nonduplicated
personal expenses, such as meals, which otherwise are not deductible.
In spite of the previously mentioned justifications for adopting the Com-
missioner's rule, arguments can be formed to show a discrimination
against a taxpayer who prefers his own bed, rather than a bed in another
Is Id. at 340.
19 Supra note 1, at 447; supra note 6, at 207.
20 Supra note 1, at 448, n. 14; For examples of other tests applied in this area
see Jerome Mortrud, 44 T.C. 208, 214 (1965) where the court commented on
the "daily routine test" which places emphasis on whether the taxpayer left
the general surroundings of his tax home; Amaroso v. Commissioner, 193
F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1952) where the "distance test" was referred to, which
placed the deduction on a mileage basis; cf. supra note 1, at 448, n. 14.
21 Supra note 1, at 448.
22 REVENUE AcT oF 1918, §214(a) (1); allowed a deduction for "ordinary and
necessary business expenses." At first the Commissioner refused to allow any
deduction under §214(a) (1) for meals and lodging, but later took a more
liberal view allowing a deduction for the cost of meals and lodging in excess
of ordinary expenses incurred at home. This liberal view was then stretched
even further to allow the entire amount to the deduction in Revenue Act of
1921 §214(a) (1) due to difficulty involved in calculating the expense.
23 Supra note 1, at 448, n. 18.
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city. Discrimination might also be charged from the fact that the "sleep
or rest" rule allows, even if only partially, a windfall to a qualified
taxpayer.
A major influence on the Court to sustain the Commissioner's long
standing interpretation was the presumption of congressional approval
from the legislative reenactment of substantially the same travel deduc-
tion provision while cognizant of the Treasury's construction of that
provision.14 In order to properly appraise such a position by the Court,
it is necessary to establish what authority the Treasury has to issue
rulings and what effect these rulings have on the courts. Rulings and
regulations prescribed by administrative agencies are generally classified
as either interpretative or legislative. Legislative rulings are the product
of a specific delegation of legislative authority to an administrative
agency by Congress to promulgate rules in areas of uncertainty left un-
touched by the legislature.2 5 These rulings are accorded the force and
effect of law unless they are clearly in conflict with express statutory
provisions, exceed the scope of delegated authority, or are unreasonable
or arbitrary in their application. 26 Therefore, the reviewing court may
not substitute its judgment as to the content of the ruling but is restricted
to a determination of its validity 27 under the above mentioned test. Not-
withstanding the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to refer to rulings
or regulations as legislative,2 the Court has recognized "the power to
prescribe regulations legislative in character"2 9 and furthermore, has
accorded this type of regulation the force and effect of law.2 0 Section
150231 of the 1954 Code is an example of a specific delegation of legis-
lative power. It delegates to the secretary the authority "to prescribe
such regulations as he may deem necessary in order that ... a con-
solidated return" clearly reflects income and to prevent tax avoidance.
Such delegation has been recognized as legislative in character.32
Interpretative rulings, on the other hand, may rest upon broad
statutory authority or result from the particular objectives assigned to
24 Supra note 1, at 449.
25 1 DAVIs, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE, 312 (1958).
26Id. at 314-315; See also Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 305 F.2d 850 (Ct.
Cl. 1962); Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107 (1942).
2 Santa Monica Mountain Pack Co., Ltd. v. United States, 99 F.2d 450 (9th
Cir. 1958); O'Neill v. United States, 21 AFTR2d 774 (D.C. Ohio 1968).
28 Supra note 25, at 307; See also DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES-TEXT-
PROBLEMS, 107-111 (2d ed. 1965) where it is shown that despite the fact that
the Supreme Court does not use the term Legislative Regulation, it does give
regulations legislative in nature the force and effect of law.
29 Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934).
30 American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936). cf. Cory
Corp. v. Sauber, 363 U.S. 709 (1960).
31 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1502.
32 Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1964) ; where the
court held that §141 (b), the predecessor to §1502, was a grant of legislative
authority, and that regulations prescribed pursuant to this section have the
force and effect of law.
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the administrative agency.3 3 These rulings, akin to guidelines or con-
structions by the Commissioner, are used to clarify statutory ambiguities.
The courts' inquiry into these rulings is broader than in the area of
legislative rulings since in the absence of some helpful legislative history
it has been held that the court may exercise its wisdom as to the content
of the rulings' which in effect is deciding on the desirability of the in-
terpretation. Notwithstanding this broad discretion, the courts have ac-
corded these rulings substantial weight when (1) Congress has reenacted
a code provision without a relevant amendment in the light of a known
Treasures interpretation of that provision,35 (2) where there is a long
continued Treasury interpretation having acquired the "sanction of
usage," '3 6 or (3) where there is a contemporaneous construction by an
agency of a statutory term.3 7 Under section 7805 of the 195438 code,
Congress delegated to the Treasury the authority "to prescribe all need-
ful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the entire code, as
distinguished from the specific authorizations of legislative power found
in sections like 1502.39 Despite the lack of a specific holding by the
court recognizing that the Commissioner may prescribe interpretative
rulings under section 7805, it would seem that the legislature intended
just that since it would be superfluous to have both the specific grants
and section 7805 delegating legislative authority. Furthermore, unless
section 7805 delegates interpretative authority, the Treasury is without
a specific authorization to formulate interpretations of the Code.40 Pro-
fessor Davis in his Administrative Law treatise states that section 7805
regulations are not binding on the courts since statutory history has
treated these regulations as other than legislative despite the appearance
of a legislative delegation from the words of that section. 41 Correl lends
support to the aforementioned proposition because there the Court relied
upon the reenactment rationale to sustain a ruling issued pursuant to a
section similar to section 780542 which construed section 23(a) (1) (A)
33 Supra note 25, at 300.
34Id. at §5.05; see also Comment, 40 CoLuTm. L. REv. 252, 260-261 (1940);
O'Neill v. United States, 21 AFTA 2d, 774 (D.C. Ohio 1968).
35 Cammaro v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Helvering v. Winwell, 305
U.S. 70 (1938) ; Cf. Commissioner v. Archer, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) ; where there
was a conflict between administrative and judicial interpretation which might
have been argued against the use of reenactment in Correll, due to attack
prior to on the "Overnight Rule' 'by some courts.
36 1 MrERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §3.19 (1962) ; See also United
States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 W.S. 77 (1932).
3 Supra note 25, at §5.06.
38 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7805.
39 Supra note 31.
40Outside of the specific delegations of certain code provisions to prescribe
rules and regulations for the purpose stated in the provision, Section 7805 is
the only other delegation of authority to promulgate rules and regulations
for the Code.
41 Supra note 25, at 300.
42 The ruling relied on in Correll was a 1940 ruling issued pursuant to §3791 of
the Internal Rev. Code, which was the predecessor to Section 7805, of the 1954
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of 1939 Code, a provision lacking a specific grant of legislative power.4 3
If the ruling was legislative, it would have the force and effect of law
without reliance upon reenactment.
The Correll decision gives some insight as to the force and effect to
be accorded interpretative rulings but the Court failed to clearly indicate
whether the rules it laid down apply to all interpretative rulings or only
when the reenactment rationale applies. The Supreme Court recognized
the possibility that improvements to the "sleep or rest" rule might be
imagined44 but felt that it "did not sit as a committee of revision to
perfect the administration of tax laws" since the Commissioner and not
the court was empowered by section 7805 "to prescribe needful rules
and regulations. ' 45 In line with this policy, the Court laid down the
following standard:
The rule of the judiciary in cases of this sort, begins and ends
with assurring that the Commissioner's regulation falls within
his authority to implement the Congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.
46
Due to the Courts' failure to define the term "congressional mandate"
the aforementioned standard lends itself to several interpretations. It
could be alleged that Congress expressed its mandate in section 7805,
and that any reasonable ruling by the Commissioner for the enforcement
of the Code is binding upon the courts except as to the question of
validity. This interpretation clearly results in a reversal of weight pre-
viously accorded interpretative rulings.47 On the other hand, it could be
argued that "congressional mandate" means the legislative purpose un-
derlying each code provision. In order to discover what Congress in-
tended to accomplish by a specific provision it would appear that at
least some evidence of legislative history or an interpretation acquiesced
to by the legislature must be presented. However, in the absence of an
arbitrary ruling and any such evidence of legislative intent, it could be
argued that due to the Court's policy expressed in Correll the ruling
should be sustained since it is within the province of the Commission
and not the Court to interpret the Code.4 8 This likewise would be a
reversal of the existing rules applied to such rulings. In all fairness to
the Court, it is doubtful whether the Court would have resorted to such
ambiguity as is present in Correll if it intended to effect a radical change
in the treatment of the interpretative rulings. Therefore, the Court
might have been merely setting forth the standard to be applied in cases
Code, since the ruling interpreted §23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939 Code; supra note
10.
43 Supra note 25.
44 Supra note 1, at 449.
45 Id. at 450.
46 Ibd.
1 Supra note 33.
48 Supra note 1, at 450.
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of congressional acquiescence to a ruling. Such an interpretation is
clearly in line with pre-existing authority ;49 furthermore, the Court relied
upon congressional acquiescence through reenactment in Correll. Not-
withstanding the improbability of a reversal of existing law, the Court
does appear to at least take the first step toward giving increased weight
to Treasury interpretations through its acknowledgement that in the
"area of limitless factual variations it is the province of Congress and
the Commissioner not the courts to make the appropriate adjustments"50
in the Code. In line with this policy, it is conceivable that the Court feels
that greater respect should be accorded to interpretative rulings; how-
ever, notwithstanding the use of words connoting a legislative type test,
it is doubtful whether the Court has in mind a complete reversal of the
pre-existing standard to the extent of limiting the scope of review to
the validity of the ruling.51
One of the more enlightening statements in the Correll decision was
the Court's reiteration of its long-continued acceptance of the reenact-
ment rationale.52 The theory underlying this rationale presumes that
Congress is fully cognizant of all relevant Treasury rulings and regula-
tions and tacitly approves them by reenacting the Code provision with-
out an amendment to correct a mistaken construction. 5 This assumption
of congressional omniscience of all outstanding interpretations and ac-
quiescence by failure to amend, has been challenged as being more ideal-
istic than realistic. 54 This attack has merit since without any legislative
history acknowledging an interpretation, there is no concrete evidence
of legislative approval, which is the basis of the rationale. The Supreme
Court recognized this issue and avoided it in Correll by citing senate
committee reports, which reveal a congressional awareness of the Com-
missioner's "Overnight Rule."5 5 In so doing, the Court might be indi-
cating that hereafter it will require some explicit evidence of congres-
sional recognition before the reenactment rule will be sustained, thus
49 Supra note 25.
50 Supra note 1, at 450; See also Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 296
(1966).
51See O'Neill v. United States, 21 AFTA2d 774 (D.C. Ohio 1968), where the
court in a case subsequent to Correll reiterated the pre-existing standard that
Courts could exercise their wisdom concerning the content of interpretative
regulations but did not mention the Correll decision.
52 Supra note 1, at 449.
53 Supra note 24, at §5.07; cf. Brown, Regulation, Reenactments and Revenue
Acts, 54 HARv. L. REv. 398 (1941), which states that reenactment should be
given no weight; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431
(1955), where the Court in reference to reenactment said "... is on unre-
liable indicum at best."
54 See Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations In Statutory Construction, 49
YALE L. J. 660 (1939-1940) ; Also See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States,
91 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1937) where judge Learned Hand stated, "To sup-
pose that Congress must particularly correct each mistaken construction under
penalty of incorporating it into the fabric of the statute appears to us un-
warranted ..."
55 Supra note 1, at 449, n. 20.
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negotiating arguments of implied recognition not supported by concrete
evidence. This seems to require at least some legislative history evidenc-
ing congressional awareness of the Treasury interpretation before the
Code provision at issue was reenacted.
The Correll decision also indicated that the adoption of a new Code
in 1954 was sufficient to qualify under the term reenactment 5 since the
Court dealt with a ruling interpreting Section 2 3 (a) (1) (A) 57 of the
1939 Code, which was substantially adopted in the 1954 Code as Section
162(a) (2).58
In conclusion, Correll has at least solved the muddle surrounding
deductions for meal and lodging, by sustaining the Commissioner's
"Sleep or Rest" Rule, which places the emphasis upon the necessity of
rest, rather than the duration of distance of the business trip. This tran-
quility in the area of travel expense deduction will probably last as long
as it takes a taxpayer to attempt to stretch the word "rest" to cover a
"catnap" or some other species of rest. Hopefully, if the issue is pre-
sented, the Commissioner will be more explicit than using the term
overnight, when in fact, he means sleep or rest, and the courts will not
attempt to replace an arbitrary, but a practical rule, for one that is
merely arbitrary.
JEFFREY R. FULLER
i6 Reenactment originally applied to reenactment of biennial Revenue Acts be-
fore 1939; See BITTER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND Girt TAXATION 24
(3d ed. 1964).3 Supra note 10.
58 Supra note 7.
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